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Philosophical methodology has rarely been scrutinized and a subject to var-
ious opposing accounts as much as in the last decade. One of the reasons 
for this are challenges raised by the naturalistic movement of experimental 
philosophy (xphi), which offered a negative perspective and many critiques 
of, generally speaking, the dominant view in contemporary philosophy 
about what philosophy is all about, and the signifi cance of its distinctive 
method, i.e. intuitional methodology. By using methods of empirical sci-
ences and conducting numerous researches relevant to various disciplines 
in philosophy, experimental philosophy challenges the overly reliance on 
the method of cases and intuitions as a source of evidence. As time pro-
gressed, initial experimentalist’s challenges required several modifi cations 
as they received a lot of criticisms by philosophers who endorse intuitional 
methodology as well as those who are skeptical of it. So this volume is 
about experimental philosophy in relation to intuitional methodology, and 
attempts of “reexamining its roots—to articulate just what the targets, 
aims, and methods of experimental philosophy really are” as Jeniffer Nado 
states in the introductory part (4). And each of the contributing articles 
gives, in one way or another, a new perspective on how experimental phi-
losophy is to be understood, or in what direction it should advance. In this 
fashion they provide a useful insight into the metaphilosophical issue from 
experimental philosophy’s point of view. This volume is one in the series 
Advances in Experimental Philosophy edited by James R. Beebe and in 
many levels brings insightful perspective on the currently highly debated 
topic in metaphilosophy, that of appealing to intuitions.
In the fi rst article of this volume, Jonathan Weinberg, discusses the 
relation between the two important epistemological and methodological 
notions: reliability and trustworthiness. The latter is especially impor-
tant in the light of Weinberg’s new perspective of how experimentalist’s 
challenge should precisely be formulated. Weinberg starts his discus-
sion with questioning the hypothesis that it is reasonable to accept some 
source of evidence only on the basis that it is a reliable one. This would be 
true, Weinberg continues, if reliability is the “main determination of the 
methodological trustworthiness” (12). But since any degree of reliability 
less than perfect is consistent with the high degree of untrustworthiness, 
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Weinberg argues that the notion of baseline reliability is methodologically 
inadequate. That means that even if intuitions are regarded as a reliable 
source of evidence, they are, methodologically speaking, untrustworthy. For 
one thing, the weakness in our inferential recourses can transform a highly 
reliable source to an inadequate one, and for another, intuitions do not have 
suffi cient power to enable us to decide between two competing theories. To 
furthermore support his thesis, Weinberg discusses some theoretical impli-
cations of the current philosophical practice. One of them is the high vulner-
ability of philosophical theories to counterexamples where it is enough just 
to fi nd one such example to overrule the theory, considering that this is not 
standard procedure in other sciences. For this reason Weinberg investigates 
the possibility of a different philosophical methodology. He proposes that 
we should ask ourselves whether philosophical truth must have exception-
intolerant form and, consequently, whether we should put more weight 
on methodology that is exception-tolerant. Even if we decide that modally 
strong claims—such as “knowledge is…”, where “is” is an identity claim—
are worthy of philosophical pursuit, there are plenty theoretical results that 
are of value in achieving in philosophy in the exception-tolerant manner. 
The example of that are generic claims, as one such claim in epistemology, 
e.g. knowledge is justifi ed true belief, is very useful peace of epistemological 
lore, according to Weinberg. And since the classical philosophical method 
of appealing to intuitions is not very useful in testing rival philosophical 
generics, Weinberg sees precisely this area as an appropriate place for ex-
perimental philosophy. It can give us tools for measuring the preference of 
one theory over the other, which are not just “hand-waving, it-seems-to-me 
kinds of ways” (29). According to this view, experimental philosophy could 
take the role of cleaning up philosophy’s data set.
In “How to Do Better: Toward Normalizing Experimentation in Epis-
temology”, John Turri is reviewing fi ve cases where philosophers—or to be 
precise epistemologists—have deeply mischaracterized the “commonsense 
epistemology”, conception they very frequently appeal to. For instance, epis-
temologists, almost unanimously advocate the idea that knowledge requires 
reliability and that this is a matter of common sense. But when this hy-
pothesis is put to test, results show that knowledge judgments are insensi-
tive to the information about reliability. Turri conducted a survey where 
participants, typically in similar percentage, attributed knowledge to both 
reliably and unreliably gained processes. He found the same results in the 
cases of contextualism, epistemic closure principle, truth-insensitive theo-
ries of justifi cation, and knowledge attribution in “fake barn” cases. In each 
of these cases epistemologists typically argue that their proposed theory is 
“intuitive”, “has basis in ordinary language”, or that it is “a defi ning feature 
of commonsense epistemology” (40). But when tested, subjects typically do 
not respond as theory predicts. Turri concludes that the standard practice 
in analytic philosophy is to rely on “introspection and anecdotal social ob-
servation to characterize commonsense epistemology” (45), and that this 
has two potentially signifi cant implications. First is a negative perception 
of the contemporary academic philosophy where people are suspicious of the 
possibility that important philosophical questions can be answered from the 
armchair. Second relies on the fact that people cannot relate to judgments 
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that philosophers treat as obvious, intuitive or commonsensical (e.g. judg-
ment that the “brain-in-the-vat” and normal human are equally justifi ed in 
their beliefs, or that the agent in the “fake barn” case does not have knowl-
edge). The role of preliminary experiments conducted by experimental phi-
losophy can help to avoid these mistakes and thereby put researchers on 
more promising paths by avoiding the false start.
The move from talking about the main experimentalist’s target, i.e. 
philosophical intuitions as part of what makes philosophy methodologi-
cally unique, to the talk about thought experiments, where intuitions are 
generated is proposed by Joshua Alexander in his article “Thought Experi-
ments, Mental Modeling, and Experimental Philosophy”. He thinks that 
this should be done by considering two dominant approaches to thought ex-
periments in the philosophy of science: the “argument view” and the “men-
tal model view”. The underlying idea behind the fi rst view is that thought 
experiments are nothing more than colorful arguments and that they can be 
reconstructed as premises and assumptions leading to the conclusion. Ac-
cording to the second view, thought experiments are not solely arguments 
because narrative of the thought experiments allows us to “mobilize cogni-
tive recourses that would not otherwise be available” (58), in terms of ma-
nipulation of mental models in our imaginations. In other words, without 
the narratives in thought experiments, our ability to arrive at the conclu-
sion they are intended to support would be compromised. According to Al-
exander, placing a philosophical cognition in the center of the debate along 
the suggested lines actually makes experimental philosophy, as an empiri-
cal study about philosophical issues, more important rather than less. To 
clarify this thesis, Alexander discusses one of the most controversial claims 
in experimental philosophy, namely the claim that people think differently 
about the narratives used in thought experiments. This is what he calls 
the “narrative incompleteness” problem, according to which many details in 
fi ctional narratives are often left out for the reason to be as less distractive 
as possible. Now, even though some opponents of experimental philosophy 
would argue that this feature of fi ctional narratives shows that there is 
no philosophical disagreement but instead that people simply have differ-
ent fi ctional narratives in mind, Alexander claims that this should not be 
understood as a critique of experimental philosophy. It rather underscores 
the relevance of experimental philosophy because it investigates how people 
think about fi ctional narratives used in philosophical thought experiments, 
that is, to what information used in narratives people are responding. To 
conclude, by reframing the discussion in terms of thought experiments in-
stead of intuitions, Alexander is maintaining that arguments against ex-
perimental philosophy could be reinterpreted in a way to actually support a 
need of experimental philosophy.
The only paper in this book that does not examine prospects of experi-
mental philosophy in a positive way is “Gettier’s Method” by Max Deutsch. 
He aims to revisit the broadly endorsed metaphilosophical view—also en-
dorsed by the experimentalists—that analytic philosophy employs method 
of cases and that intuitions are essential part of this method. As can be 
extracted from Deutsch’s paper, there are two interpretations of the “intu-
ition-view” that are under his attack:
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(i) Gettier cases are examples of appealing to intuitions as evidence, and 
(ii) Gettier cases are examples of both arguments and appealing to intu-
itions as evidence.
Concerning the fi rst interpretation, Deutsch argues that Gettier does not 
appeal to intuitions, and that since intuitions play no role in his argument 
against the traditional JTB theory of knowledge, his thought experiments 
are not examples of the method of cases. Deutsch’s reasoning is as follows. 
(I) Gettier nowhere uses the term “intuition”, and nowhere argues that we 
should accept his cases on the basis of intuitiveness. And the possibility 
that Gettier might appeal to intuitions implicitly is rather weak, according 
to Deutsch. Furthermore, (II) Gettier is not vague about the justifi cation 
for his conclusions, and provides an explicit argument stated in his fi rst 
case as follows: even though Smith believes truly and with justifi cation that 
the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket, his belief is merely 
lucky one and does not amount to knowledge. Regarding the second inter-
pretation that Gettier cases are examples of both arguments and appealing 
to intuitions as evidence, Deutsch does not undermine its possibility, but 
insists that there is no evidence to suggest that such a possibility is actual. 
Even more puzzling for Deutsch is what he calls the “usual view”, according 
to which Gettier does presents argument against the JTB theory, but he 
does not present argument for premises of this argument. Instead, as this 
view suggests, these premises are supported by intuition alone. Deutsch 
argues that explicit argument for the conclusion that Smith does not know 
that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket, namely, the 
presence of luck, qualifi es as a good reason for denying Smith’s knowledge. 
And concludes that it is a mistake to understand Gettier cases in a way 
that he intended for intuitions to reveal the falsity of JTB theory of knowl-
edge. The further reason Deutsch discusses of why we should reject the view 
that thought experiments are about appealing to intuitions is that the post 
Gettier literature proceeded in an entirely intuition-free way (e.g. Michael 
Clark (1963), Alvin Goldman (1967)).
The problem for Deutsch’s view could potentially be an interpretation that 
the order of explanation goes the other way around, namely, via abduction 
Gettier is arguing that the anti-luck premise is the best explanation of the 
truth of the conclusion that Smith does not know. This could pose a problem 
for Deutsch’s position only if the anti-luck condition is intended to be fully 
abductive, and he thinks that this is extremely unlikely. One reason is that 
at the time of publishing Gettier’s article, it would be highly controversial 
and unorthodox to take conclusions as granted in order to abductively argue 
for the anti-luck condition. It is more likely, according to Deutsch, that Get-
tier intended it the other way around. Additionally, the so-called producer-
consumer distinction serves as a further reason not to accept Gettier cases 
as paradigm examples of the method of cases. As Deutsch sees it, Gettier 
himself could not use intuitions as evidence since the process of constructing 
thought experiment is anything but “passive sort of cognizing characteristic 
of intuiting that something is so” (85). And even thought, we as consumers, 
might experience intuitions about his examples, this is irrelevant for its evi-
dential status since Gettier construed his cases as counterexamples, and pre-
sumably had evidence for it before we get the chance to read them.
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In the next article titled “Intuitive Diversity and Disagreement” Ron 
Mallon considers a subset of critiques against the experimental philosophy, 
specifi cally, the subset that argues that, even though Platonic armchair 
method (i.e. the method consulting a priori intuitions about general philo-
sophical truths) is a bad methodology, it is not wildly employed by philoso-
phers. And this subset of critiques offers alternative explanations of what 
exactly philosophers employ in such cases. Mallon’s aim is to argue that 
experimental philosophical challenge—or at least one version of the chal-
lenge, namely the argument from disagreement—poses the same problem 
for these alternative interpretations of the philosophical method as it does 
for the Platonic armchair method. This is because Mallone holds the fol-
lowing two assumption: (i) the challenge “need not depend on attacking a 
distinctively Platonic armchair, or on any eccentric psychological construal 
of the relevant mental states” (108), and (ii) intuitions “pick out the sorts 
of seemings or judgments involved in our target cases” and also “behavioral 
manifestations of those judgments produced in response to philosophical 
thought experimental surveys” (100).
One of the alternative interpretations under Mallone’s critique is the 
suggestion that philosophers do not actually appeal to intuitions as evi-
dence. One example of this alternative interpretation is presented in the 
previous section when discussing Deutsch’s view. First of all, Mallone re-
jects the underlying idea of this alternative interpretation that just because 
an author gives an argument for the proposed conclusion, it follows that 
author’s spontaneous judgment that p plays no evidential role. According 
to Mallone, this is not a valid inference, for both spontaneous intuition as 
a source of evidence and reasons why intuition is considered to be true can 
be held at the same time. And this is, in Mallone’s view, supported by many 
thought experiments where it is obvious that they are not to be understood 
as pure arguments, because in order to be valid, they must be supplemented 
with substantial assumptions about topics under investigations (e.g. as-
sumption about the nature of knowledge). But even if we allow that philoso-
phers do appeal to intuitions in their arguments, critics would further argue 
that they need not to do so, and thus variability in intuitional judgments 
would no longer pose a problem for philosophy. And at this point, Mallone 
shows in what way this alternative explanation does not avoid the problems 
of the argument from disagreement. Namely, experimental philosophy criti-
cizes “actual rather than possible practice” (115), and thusly still presents 
the problem for philosophical practice. The other alternative interpretation 
that Mallone considers in his paper is the mentalist approach, which takes 
that intuitions do not reveal some abstract reality as the Platonic armchair 
approach does, but rather facts about human concepts, or some other psy-
chological mechanisms that produce intuitions. But nonetheless, mentalist 
approach is also affected by the argument from disagreement, because its 
proponents are interested in shared concepts. And whether some particular 
concept is common cannot be revealed from the armchair.
Jenniffer Nado further develops the idea of “reexamining roots” in the 
paper “Intuitions and the Theory of Reference” she coauthored with Michael 
Johnson. The general idea that they develop is that experimental philoso-
phy is especially relevant in the theory of reference, but reasons for its rel-
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evance cannot be extended to other fi elds of philosophy. To show this, they 
focus on the particular experimental study conducted by Edouard Machery 
et al. where they fi nd that cross-cultural differences in responses to Kripke’s 
Gödel case undermine the viability of the intuitional methodology. Nado 
and Johnson argue that reports in such surveys is primary methodology in 
the theory of reference, but do not show, as Machery et al. claim, that rely-
ing on intuitions is a bad methodology. The reason is that such reports (i.e. 
judgments about cases) are “instances of speakers applying terms to things 
that have been generated under controlled conditions to test the predictions 
of different theories” (148). And cases of people applying terms for things 
are primary data for theory of reference. They furthermore argue that this 
reason is not straightforwardly applicable to other fi elds, since the correct 
application of terms, such as “time” and “consciousness”, depend on some 
extra-linguistic facts that are not easily accessible, and therefore intuitions 
about those terms would be of little evidential use. So, the assessment of 
intuitions as a source of evidence will vary from fi eld to fi eld and conse-
quently, so will the relevance of experimental philosophy.
In the last paper of this volume, “Intuitive Evidence and Experimen-
tal Philosophy”, Jonathan Ichikawa claims that experimental studies are 
relevant for philosophical methodology, but only in the limited sense. His 
account of intuitions, that is intuitional methodology, is that it is a mis-
characterization of philosophical practice to claim that intuitions are used 
in a central evidential way. But he also argues that this fact alone does 
not make experimental studies redundant (which is the usual stance for 
someone who denies evidential role of intuitions). Namely, he agrees with 
proponents of experimental philosophy that their surveys and interpreta-
tions of those surveys do not, in any clear way, depend on the assumption 
that intuitions have an evidential role. This is defended from the standpoint 
that empirical investigation of intuitions can be relevant for philosophical 
methodology even though they do not play evidential roles, since evidential 
role is not the only role of epistemic signifi cance. However, Ichikawa thinks 
that this alone is not enough to defend experimental philosophy. He argues 
that even though experimental philosophy survey’s results do not essential-
ly make use of intuitions the same does not hold for their analysis. In other 
words, the replacement of the term “intuition” with any other non-problem-
atic term in their analysis cannot be done straightforwardly. And this is 
where Ichikawa sees the biggest challenge for the defense of experimental 
philosophy, although not as big to make it irrelevant. For example, propo-
nents of experimental philosophy often claim that intuitions are susceptible 
to order-effect which makes them not suitable as evidence. Even under the 
assumption that intuitions are not to have an evidential role, the fact that 
they are so susceptible should be the reason to doubt one’s ability to ratio-
nally respond to the available evidence, and seek guidance how to proceed 
thereafter. To sum up, philosophical biases are epistemically relevant, and 
it is worthwhile to engage in attempt to detect them.
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